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Contestatory Democracy and the Interpretation of 
Popular Initiatives 
Glen Staszewski* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ballot initiative process is theoretically interesting and 
increasingly important for a variety of reasons.  This Essay focuses on 
the question of how successful ballot measures should be interpreted 
when disputes arise regarding their meaning or scope.  For example, 
does an initiative, which provides that “the union of one man and 
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a 
marriage or similar union for any purpose,”1 prohibit public 
employers from providing domestic partnership benefits to their gay 
and lesbian employees?2  I rely on recent insights from civic 
republican theory to argue that the interpretation of popular 
initiatives should be understood as a form of contestatory democracy.  
This vision of statutory interpretation demonstrates the need to adopt 
certain substantive canons or structural reforms, which would 
promote freedom as non-domination and thereby improve the 
democratic legitimacy of the ballot initiative process. 
II. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF POPULAR INITIATIVES 
In the leading law review article on this topic, Professor Jane 
Schacter demonstrated that when courts interpret successful 
 
* The A.J. Thomas Faculty Scholar, Associate Dean for Research, and Professor 
of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.  Portions of this Essay are drawn 
from my previous work on direct democracy and statutory interpretation, including: 
Statutory Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2013); The 
Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17 (2006); and Rejecting the Myth 
of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
395 (2003).  I am grateful to Lauren Repole and the Seton Hall Law Review for 
inviting me to participate in the 2012 Seton Hall Law Review Symposium and for 
their outstanding hospitality.  I would also like to thank Michael Sant’Ambrogio for 
providing insightful comments on an earlier draft.  Finally, I would like to thank 
Kathryn Hespe for helpful research assistance.  
 1  See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.  
 2  See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 
2008) (resolving this issue).  
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initiatives, they typically apply the same “intentionalist” methodology 
that is traditionally used to interpret ordinary legislation.3  Instead of 
ascertaining the intent of a legislature, however, courts purport to 
ascertain the intent of the voters in the ballot initiative context.  
Schacter also demonstrated that when courts ascertain the intent of 
the voters, they rely almost exclusively on formal legal sources of 
meaning, including the language of a ballot measure, the language of 
related statutes, canons of statutory construction, legal precedent, 
and information from ballot pamphlets, which is sometimes used as a 
substitute for legislative history.4  Meanwhile, courts routinely ignore 
media accounts and advertising as potential sources of voter intent, 
despite social science literature suggesting that those sources are 
most likely to influence the positions of voters in ballot campaigns.5  
Schacter pointed out that this approach to the interpretation of 
popular initiatives results in a paradox, because “the hierarchy of  
interpretive sources that courts consult in the asserted service of 
locating popular intent is roughly inverse to the hierarchy of 
informational sources that voters consult most regularly in ballot 
campaigns.”6 
Professor Schacter also explained that a judicial inquiry into the 
popular intent of the electorate will frequently be an exercise in 
futility for a variety of reasons.  First, the widely recognized problems 
of intentionalism in ordinary statutory interpretation are magnified 
in the context of popular initiatives.7  For example, even if individual 
voters formulated an ascertainable intent on the detailed questions of 
interpretation that are typically presented to courts, the judiciary 
simply could not cumulate what might be millions of voter intentions 
on an issue.8  Similarly, while it might be reasonable to assume that 
elected legislators have some detailed knowledge of the intended 
meaning of newly enacted statutes, many of the specific legal 
consequences of popular initiatives are systematically unforeseeable 
 
 3  See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct 
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 117–19 (1995); see also Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth 
of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
395, 406–11 (2003) (summarizing Schacter’s groundbreaking research, and citing 
the work of other scholars who subsequently made similar findings).  
 4  See Schacter, supra note 3, at 119–23.  
 5  See id.; see also id. at 131–38 (canvassing social science research regarding 
influences on voter behavior in ballot elections).  
 6  Id. at 130.  
 7  See id. at 124–26. 
 8  See id. at 124–25. 
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to the electorate.9  Voters generally lack any “detailed knowledge of 
the legal context surrounding a proposed initiative.”10  Moreover, 
voters are often unfamiliar with the technical language that is used in 
the text of proposed ballot measures.11  Indeed, a wide range of 
empirical evidence suggests that many voters do not even read, much 
less understand, the text of proposed ballot measures.12 
Unlike the voters, the initiative proponents, who draft proposed 
ballot measures and campaign for their enactment, are routinely 
capable of researching, understanding, and even partially controlling 
the formal legal sources used by courts to interpret successful ballot 
initiatives.13  The overwhelming influence of these unelected and 
largely unaccountable initiative sponsors would only be exacerbated 
if courts discarded intentionalism in favor of the other leading 
interpretive methodologies in this context.14  Thus, strict textualism 
and its reliance on the “plain meaning” of an enactment would seem 
particularly unjustifiable when it is well established that most voters 
do not read or fully comprehend the language of initiative 
measures—which are often ambiguously drafted in the first place 
(and sometimes strategically so).15  To the extent that textualism is 
 
 9  See id. at 127–28. 
 10  See Schacter, supra note 3, at 128. 
 11  See id. at 127–28.   
 12  See id. at 139–40 and nn.136–44; see also Staszewski, supra note 3, at 408 and 
n.53 (collecting sources).  
 13  See Schacter, supra note 3, at 128–30; Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in 
Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 47–48 (2006); Staszewski, supra note 3, at 432–
35; see also Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct 
Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 519 (“Unlike the electorate as a whole, many 
of the active participants . . . are frequent ‘players’ in the repeat game of direct 
democracy [who can be expected to pay attention to judicial decisions].”); Elizabeth 
Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 17, 30 (1997) (“[B]allot 
proposals are drafted by repeat players who can learn the rules of statutory 
interpretation and behave accordingly.”). 
 14  Staszewski, supra note 13, at 48.  
 15  See Frickey, supra note 13, at 481 (“For a variety of reasons, direct democracy is 
probably more likely than legislative lawmaking to produce ambiguous statutory 
text.”); Elisabeth R. Gerber, et al., When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter 
Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement, 66 J. OF POL. 43, 58 (2004) 
(arguing that the “realities of the initiative process often render some degree of 
vagueness inevitable,” partly because “some initiative proponents do not have 
enough information to write detailed implementation instructions,” and partly 
because “appealing to broad principles rather than specific policy changes may be 
seen as a better way to cultivate an electoral majority”); Schacter, supra note 3, at 
149–50 (explaining that the “animating, yet often untenable, idea that there is a 
single ordinary or plain meaning” is especially problematic in the ballot initiative 
context).  
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justified by a desire to respect the compromises or deals that are 
facilitated by the federal constitutional structure and its requirements 
of bicameralism and presentment,16 there would be no reason to 
extend its application to a lawmaking process where those safeguards 
are deliberately omitted.17  The same consideration would undermine 
heavy reliance on purposivism in this context because this approach 
to statutory interpretation is based largely on optimistic assumptions 
of coherent action by elected representatives in an ongoing 
deliberative process, which cannot plausibly be extended to the one-
shot process of direct decision making on a single subject by the 
electorate.18  In addition, routinely construing ambiguity in a 
generous fashion to promote an initiative’s broad underlying purpose 
would further privilege the intentions of the initiative proponents, 
and potentially lead to collateral consequences that were never 
intended by the voters and perhaps other more egregious forms of 
manipulation.19  At the end of the day, the leading foundational 
theories of statutory interpretation simply do not translate well to the 
initiative context. 
III. THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
We therefore need to develop a different way of thinking about 
statutory interpretation in the ballot initiative context.20  In so doing, 
it is useful to keep in mind precisely why the foundational theories 
fall short, and to adopt an alternative approach that will ameliorate 
those difficulties.  The traditional understanding of statutory 
interpretation is that the judiciary should serve as a faithful agent of 
the legislature.21  As “honest agents of the political branches,” courts 
 
 16  See generally John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001).  
 17  Staszewski, supra note 13, at 48.  
 18  Id.; see also Frickey, supra note 13, at 486–87; Garrett, supra note 13, at 32–33. 
 19  Staszewski, supra note 13, at 48; see also Schacter, supra note 3, at 158–59 
(recognizing that “a broad-purpose approach” could encourage “abuse of the 
initiative process” and that an appropriate rule of narrow construction “would 
reduce the incentives for initiative proponents to draft long, intricate, and 
ambiguous laws, the complexity of which can effectively be shrouded by slogans and 
soundbites”). 
 20  This Part draws heavily from my previous work on statutory interpretation 
theory, which was recently published in the William and Mary Law Review.  See Glen 
Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 
(2013).   
 21  See Manning, supra note 16, at 5; Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing 
Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594–95, 599–
603 (1995).  
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“carry out decisions they do not make.”22  Because statutory 
interpretation allegedly implements previous decisions by an elected 
legislature, and does not involve creative policymaking by courts, the 
enterprise is consistent with, and, indeed, affirmatively facilitates 
majoritarian democracy.23  From this perspective, the democratic 
pedigree of statutory interpretation is impeccable, because elected 
officials who are politically accountable to the voters are making all of 
the important policy decisions.  While the dominant understanding 
of the best interpretive strategy for a faithful agent of the legislature 
has gradually shifted over the years in response to prevailing 
understandings of law and the legislative process, the leading 
approaches to statutory interpretation all achieve their democratic 
legitimacy based on the notion that courts are merely implementing 
the legislature’s policy decisions.24 
The traditional view of the democratic legitimacy of statutory 
interpretation has been difficult to sustain for a variety of reasons.25  
First, the legal realist movement and contemporary theories of 
interpretation have highlighted the inherent ambiguity of language 
and the severe limitations on legislative foresight.26  It is therefore 
widely accepted that the legislature does not resolve every issue that 
arises in statutory interpretation, and that courts have considerable 
interpretive leeway.  Second, the rise of the modern regulatory state 
has resulted in widespread delegations of broad discretionary 
authority from the legislature to other institutions, and a candid 
recognition that resolving ambiguities in federal regulatory statutes 
necessarily involves policymaking.27  Third, recent developments in 
political science have undermined the optimistic pluralistic 
conception of the legislative process that underlay the traditional 
model, and called into question the capacity of voters to hold elected 
officials accountable for their policy decisions.28  These developments 
raise serious questions about the cogency of faithful agent theory, 
and suggest that the democratic legitimacy of statutory interpretation 
 
 22  Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 60 (1984).  
 23  See Staszewski, supra note 20, at 231 (describing faithful agent theory).  
 24  See id. at 231–39.  
 25  Id. at 223–24; see also id. at 231–39 (describing the “countermajoritarian 
difficulty in statutory interpretation”).  
 26  See Schacter, supra note 21, at 599–603. 
 27  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
 28  See Schacter, supra note 21, at 603–06. 
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can no longer be taken for granted. 
Similarly, courts may appear at first glance to be acting in a 
democratically legitimate fashion when they interpret successful 
ballot measures by ascertaining the intent of the voters.  It turns out, 
however, that “voter intent” frequently does not exist, and courts 
therefore cannot be acting as faithful agents of the electorate.29  
Rather, the judiciary is either privileging the intentions of initiative 
proponents, or perhaps implementing its own policy preferences.  
Either way, the judiciary’s authority to interpret popular initiatives in 
hard cases raises serious questions of democratic legitimacy, which 
are at least as severe as the difficulties that arise when courts exercise 
policymaking discretion in the course of interpreting ordinary 
statutes.  In other words, the judiciary’s interpretation of successful 
ballot measures routinely presents the same “countermajoritarian 
difficulty” that arises whenever lawmakers have not explicitly resolved 
the precise question at issue, and courts are therefore compelled to 
make policy choices during the course of statutory interpretation. 
I have previously argued that the countermajoritarian difficulty 
in statutory interpretation can be resolved by applying recent insights 
from civic republican theory to the adjudication of statutory disputes 
in the modern regulatory state.30  From a republican perspective, 
freedom consists of the absence of the potential for arbitrary 
domination, and democracy should therefore include both electoral 
and contestatory dimensions.31  In my view, statutory interpretation in 
the modern regulatory state is best understood as a mechanism of 
contestatory democracy.32  The remainder of this Essay claims that my 
proposed understanding of statutory interpretation is even more 
compelling in the ballot initiative context, and that this theory 
suggests the adoption of certain substantive canons of statutory 
interpretation or structural reforms that would promote freedom as 
non-domination and thereby improve the democratic legitimacy of 
the ballot initiative process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 29  See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
 30  See Staszewski, supra note 20. 
 31  See Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in 
DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 164 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cardón eds., 1999). 
 32  See Staszewski, supra note 20.  
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My proposed understanding of statutory interpretation draws on 
recent literature in democratic theory, which provides an alternative 
to the liberal conception of liberty as non-interference, and identifies the 
two essential dimensions of democracy.33  Specifically, Philip Pettit 
has articulated a republican conception of liberty as non-domination, 
whereby freedom consists of the absence of the possibility of arbitrary 
domination by others.34  While government promotes liberty under 
this view by protecting citizens from the possibility of arbitrary 
domination by private parties, the government can also be a potential 
source of arbitrary domination.  It is therefore essential for any 
government that values liberty to provide safeguards to limit the 
possibility of arbitrary domination by the state.  Pettit claims that a 
republican democracy with two essential dimensions is the form of 
government that is most conducive to this understanding of 
freedom.35 
Pettit explains that limiting arbitrary governmental action 
requires mechanisms to prevent public officials from ignoring the 
interests and perspectives of ordinary people, and that this argues in 
favor of the electoral dimension of democracy.36  Periodic elections bring 
government under the control of the people in the sense that voters 
are empowered to select candidates for office based on their 
likelihood of promoting the collective interests of the people.  The 
republican argument for elections is simply that they provide a 
sensible way to force government to advance the common, perceived 
interests of citizens, and thereby provide a check against arbitrary 
domination by the state. 
Pettit recognizes, however, that elections can only provide a 
limited protection against the possibility of arbitrary domination, 
because electoral democracy is not necessarily responsive to the 
interests and perspectives of minorities.37  Indeed, “it is quite 
consistent with electoral democracy that government should only 
track the perceived interests of a majority, absolute or relative, on any 
issue and that it should have a dominating aspect from the point of 
view of others.”38  For this reason, republican theorists have always 
 
 33  Id. at 225–27, 240–45 (describing the relevant aspects of Pettit’s theory).  
 34  See generally PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT (1997). 
 35  See Pettit, supra note 31.  
 36  See id. at 173; see also Staszewski, supra note 20, at 242 (describing this aspect of 
Pettit’s theory).  
 37  See Pettit, supra note 31, at 173–78. 
 38  Id. at 174.  
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been concerned about providing structural safeguards to prevent the 
tyranny of the majority.39  “The elimination of domination would 
require, not just that the people considered collectively cannot be 
ignored by government, but also that people considered severally or 
distributively cannot be ignored either.”40 
Pettit therefore considers “whether there is any way of subjecting 
government to a mode of distributive or minority control in order to 
balance the electorally established mode of collective or majority 
control.”41  The most obvious solution is a procedure that would 
enable minorities to question public decisions on the basis of their 
perceived interests, and to trigger a review in an impartial forum 
where all “relevant interests are taken equally into account and only 
impartially supported decisions are upheld.”42  A contestatory regime 
of this nature provides citizens with the power to challenge public 
decisions on the grounds that their interests and perspectives were 
not adequately taken into account during the decision-making 
process, and the resulting decisions were therefore arbitrary.43  The 
underlying assumption is that the final decision would have been 
different if such interests were given equal consideration.44 
Pettit claims that the electoral mode of democracy promotes 
legitimacy because it ensures that governmental decisions originate, 
“however indirectly, in the collective will of the people.”45  
Significantly, however, the contestatory mode of democracy further 
improves the legitimacy of those decisions to the extent that they can 
withstand challenges brought by individuals “in forums and under 
procedures that are acceptable to all concerned.”46  Whereas the 
electoral mode of democracy “gives the collective people an indirect 
power of authorship over the laws,” the contestatory mode of 
democracy “would give the people, considered individually, a limited 
and, of course, indirect power of editorship over those laws.”47 
 
 39  See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1014–28 (2006) 
(setting forth civic republican conceptions of the legislative process, the American 
constitutional structure, and the “absurdity doctrine” in statutory interpretation).  
 40  Pettit, supra note 31, at 178. 
 41  Id.  
 42  Id. at 179.  
 43  See id. at 180.  
 44  See id.  
 45  Id.  
 46  Pettit, supra note 31, at 180. 
 47  Id. (emphasis added).  
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IV. THE TWO ESSENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
This theory of republican democracy helps us to understand 
both the value and the shortcomings of direct democracy, and it can 
provide us with a different way of thinking about the interpretation of 
successful ballot measures.  If the election of representatives helps to 
prevent the government from ignoring the interests and perspectives 
of ordinary people, and thereby “gives the collective people an 
indirect power of authorship over the laws,”48 the ballot initiative 
process gives ordinary people another, more powerful mechanism for 
expressing their views, and theoretically allows “the collective people” 
to author the laws directly.  In other words, the ballot initiative 
process exemplifies the electoral dimension of democracy. 
It is important to remember, however, that “it is quite consistent 
with electoral democracy that government should only track the 
perceived interests of a majority . . . on any issue, and that it should 
have a dominating aspect from the point of view of others.”49  Pettit 
has therefore emphasized that “[t]he elimination of domination 
would require, not just that the people considered collectively cannot 
be ignored by government, but also that people considered severally 
or distributively cannot be ignored either.”50  For this reason, the 
ballot initiative process is in desperate need of mechanisms for 
contestatory democracy, which would enable citizens to challenge public 
decisions on the grounds that their interests and perspectives were 
not adequately taken into account during the decision-making 
process, and the resulting decisions were therefore arbitrary. 
Judicial review of the constitutionality of successful initiatives 
could certainly play this role, and Professor Julian Eule famously 
argued that courts should give certain ballot measures a “harder 
judicial look” based on the absence of other structural safeguards to 
prevent majority tyranny in this context.51  Nonetheless, I want to 
suggest that the interpretation of successful ballot measures should 
also be understood as a mechanism of contestatory democracy.  After 
all, when a court decides a case or controversy about the meaning of 
a successful initiative, it is essentially resolving a “contest” over the 
 
 48  See id.; supra text accompanying note 47 (quoting Pettit).  
 49  See Pettit, supra note 31, at 174; supra text accompanying note 38 (quoting 
Pettit). 
 50  See Pettit, supra note 31, at 178; supra text accompanying note 40 (quoting 
Pettit). 
 51  See generally Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 
(1990).  
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permissible scope of governmental authority.52  Thus, for example, 
when a court decides whether an initiative that prohibits same-sex 
marriage should also be understood to prohibit public employers 
from providing domestic partnership benefits,53 it is essentially 
resolving a “contest” over whether the state can revoke the health 
care benefits of the members of certain families based on this 
enactment.  By resolving those contested issues, litigation over the 
meaning of successful ballot measures potentially gives the people, 
“considered individually, a limited and, of course, indirect power of 
editorship over those laws.”54 
My sense is that in the absence of a constitutional violation,55 the 
electoral dimension of the ballot initiative process, and the collective 
authorship of the laws that are enacted in this fashion, should be 
respected by the judiciary and other public officials who should 
generally implement the explicit policy choices of the electorate that are 
unambiguously established by “the clear text or evident, core purposes” 
of a popular initiative.56  Thus, for example, an initiative which 
provides that “the union of one man and one woman in marriage 
shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar 
union for any purpose,”57 should be understood to prohibit same-sex 
marriage and probably civil unions.  On the other hand, courts 
should adopt substantive canons of statutory interpretation that 
narrowly construe ambiguous ballot measures when the potential 
collateral consequences of a proposal were not readily apparent to 
voters, and the substantive merits of a particular course of action were 
therefore not subject to reasoned deliberation, particularly when the 
interests or perspectives of the individuals or groups who would be 
adversely affected by a proposed understanding of the law were not 
considered during the lawmaking process. 
Consistent with this approach, Professor Schacter has advocated 
the narrow interpretation of ambiguous language when it seems 
especially likely that a ballot measure was tainted by the manipulation 
 
 52  Cf. Staszewski, supra note 20, at 245–49 (claiming that the interpretation of 
ordinary statutes should be understood in this fashion in the modern regulatory 
state).  
 53  See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.  
 54  See Pettit, supra note 31, at 180; supra text accompanying note 47 (quoting 
Pettit).  
 55  This Essay does not take a position on the merits of Eule’s proposal.   
 56  Frickey, supra note 13, at 522.  
 57  See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.  
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of “highly organized, concentrated, and well-funded interests . . . .”58  
Similarly, Professor Philip Frickey has recommended the 
establishment of a strong preference for continuity in the ballot 
initiative context based on republican principles of government, 
whereby “pre-existing law is displaced by the ballot proposition only 
when the clear text or evident, core purposes of the electorate so 
require.”59  I have previously advocated the adoption of a substantive 
canon that would narrowly construe ambiguity in accordance with 
the campaign statements of initiative proponents.60  The use of these 
canons, in tandem, would alleviate the problem of faction, promote 
reasoned deliberation about the details of legislation, and discourage 
initiative proponents from seeking to mislead the electorate about 
the intended consequences of their proposals.61  As a result, these 
substantive canons would promote freedom as non-domination, and 
thereby improve the democratic legitimacy of the ballot initiative 
process.  Incidentally, they would all compel the conclusion that the 
initiative prohibiting same-sex marriage should not be interpreted to 
prohibit public employers from providing domestic partnership 
benefits.62 
V. OTHER POTENTIAL MECHANISMS OF CONTESTATORY DEMOCRACY 
We should also not lose sight of the fact that judicial review and 
statutory interpretation by courts are not the only potential 
mechanisms of contestatory democracy that are available for the 
ballot initiative process.63  For example, I have previously suggested 
that the same basic structural safeguards that apply to lawmaking by 
federal administrative agencies should be adopted in the ballot 
 
 58  See Schacter, supra note 3, at 156–61.  Professor Schacter also suggested that 
courts should encourage deliberation regarding the implementation of direct 
democratic measures by making the process of litigating the meaning of ambiguous 
ballot measures open to a broader range of perspectives.  See id. at 155–56.  I pick up 
on this intriguing suggestion in the following part of this Essay.  
 59  Frickey, supra note 13, at 522.  
 60  See Staszewski, supra note 13, at 45–55.  
 61  Id. at 50.  
 62  Compare id. at 50–52 (advocating the application of the foregoing substantive 
canons to decide that the proposal does not prohibit public employers from 
providing domestic partnership benefits), with Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor 
of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008) (holding that domestic partnership benefits 
are prohibited by the “plain meaning” of the proposal). 
 63  See PETTIT, supra note 34, at 295–96 (explaining that “procedural and 
consultative measures” during a decision-making process are “two of the three sides 
to a contestatory democracy,” and that the third side is the opportunity for ex post 
review by an impartial appellate body). 
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initiative context.64  Thus, after qualifying a measure for the ballot, 
the initiative proponents should be required to provide the general 
public with notice of their proposal and an opportunity to submit 
written comments and proposed amendments.  The initiative 
proponents should be allowed to amend their proposal in response 
to any legitimate concerns that arise, but they should also be required 
to provide a general statement of the basis and purpose of their final 
proposal that explains any major changes, in addition to their 
reasoning for rejecting various objections and proposed 
amendments.  Finally, courts should be authorized to engage in hard-
look judicial review of the validity of successful ballot measures under 
an arbitrary and capricious standard, which would allow the judiciary 
to ascertain whether the initiative proponents engaged in reasoned 
decision making during the lawmaking process.65  By requiring 
initiative proponents to consider and respond to the interests and 
perspectives of the people who would be adversely affected by their 
proposals during the lawmaking process, this structural reform would 
limit arbitrary domination by the state and thereby promote freedom 
as non-domination. 
A related topic that requires more careful consideration in the 
scholarly literature on direct democracy is the extent to which the 
interpretations of successful ballot measures by administrative 
agencies are entitled to deference from the judiciary.  My previous 
work on statutory interpretation as contestatory democracy 
recognized that “agencies are, by necessity, the primary official 
interpreters of federal statutes” in the modern regulatory state,66 and 
that statutory disputes often involve challenges to the legality of 
agency action.67  I have also argued that agencies have a variety of 
institutional advantages over courts in statutory interpretation, and 
 
 64  See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 447–59; see also Staszewski, supra note 13, at 56 
(summarizing this proposal).  
 65  Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”); 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“[An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious] if the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision 
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”).  
 66  See Staszewski, supra note 20, at 254 (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, 
and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 502–03 (2005)). 
 67  See id. at 245–47. 
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that courts should therefore frequently defer to agency decision 
making.68  The application of these insights to the ballot initiative 
context is seriously complicated, however, by the politics of 
implementing and enforcing popular initiatives.69  In this regard, 
political scientists have pointed out that “the people who create and 
support winning initiatives are not authorized to implement and to 
enforce them,” and that the initiative proponents “must delegate 
these tasks to legislatures and bureaucrats.”70  Moreover, these 
scholars have found that successful initiatives are less likely to be 
implemented and enforced than ordinary legislation because laws 
passed by voters over the objection of legislative majorities or 
governors “face powerful post-passage opposition” that is not 
encountered by legislation enacted by those officials.71  The 
organizations that sponsor ballot initiatives are further disadvantaged 
by the fact that they frequently disband after an election and 
therefore cannot easily sanction public officials who decline to 
implement or enforce their proposals.72 
While these political dynamics could be viewed as beneficial to 
the extent that they prevent ambiguous ballot measures from having 
policy consequences that were never intended by the voters, there is 
little reason to think that such “non-enforcement decisions” are likely 
to be transparent or deliberative,73 and it is troubling for the public 
officials who are responsible for implementing popular initiatives to 
ignore the clear text or evident core purposes of those measures.74  
The politics of implementing and enforcing popular initiatives could 
therefore potentially make it problematic for state courts to give 
strong deference to the decisions of state agencies in this context.  
Moreover, some state courts do not give state agencies Chevron-style 
deference even when state agencies are interpreting or implementing 
ordinary statutes that provide them with delegated lawmaking 
authority.75  Finally, to the extent that Chevron deference is premised 
 
 68  See id. at 258–61.  
 69  See Gerber et al., supra note 15; see also GERBER, ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: 
HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY (2001).  
 70  Gerber, et al., supra note 15, at 44.   
 71  Id. at 46 (emphasis omitted).   
 72  See id.   
 73  Similar problems exist when federal administrative agencies decline to 
implement their statutory mandates.  See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction 
Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369 (2009). 
 74  See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.   
 75  See, e.g., William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a 
Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1017 (2006).  
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on the legislature’s intent to delegate formal lawmaking authority to 
an administrative agency,76 it is difficult to believe that the voters could 
consciously express such an intent in the ballot initiative context, 
regardless of the clarity of the relevant statutory language.  I have 
found that law students have a hard enough time understanding the 
judiciary’s prevailing deference doctrine; to attribute such an 
understanding to ordinary voters would take the notion of a legal 
fiction to a whole new level.77  Indeed, my sense is that sophisticated 
initiative proponents would only delegate formal lawmaking authority 
to a state agency if they expected the state agency to be sympathetic 
to their policy agenda (in this regard, an initiative could even set up a 
new state agency to implement a successful ballot measure).78  If this 
intuition is accurate, then the politics of implementing and enforcing 
popular initiatives could be overcome, but the application of Chevron 
deference to a state agency’s interpretation of a successful ballot 
measure would further privilege the intentions of the initiative 
proponents in the name of voter intent. 
The best solution to this dilemma may be simply to encourage 
the state agencies that implement and enforce successful ballot 
measures to engage in reasoned deliberation about the best means of 
doing so.  My preliminary thoughts are that it is typically appropriate 
(and sometimes necessary) for initiative proponents to delegate 
lawmaking authority to state agencies, which are subsequently 
responsible for implementing successful ballot measures.  Those 
agencies should, in turn, resolve ambiguities about the meaning or 
scope of popular initiatives through deliberative procedures, such as 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and their decisions should be 
subject to hard-look judicial review.  Moreover, it may be worthwhile 
for state and local governments to establish independent 
commissions, such as the Citizens Initiative Implementation 
Oversight Commission (“CIIOC”) proposed by Elizabeth Garrett and 
Mathew McCubbins,79 which would have the authority to weigh in on 
interpretive controversies before state agencies as well as in court.  
The state agencies would thereby provide a forum for contestatory 
democracy that would utilize their substantive expertise, while the 
 
 76  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 77  Cf. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 267 
(2002) (recognizing that resting Chevron deference on Congress’s intent is a fiction).  
 78  See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative 
Framework, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 299, 334–35 (2007) (providing examples).  
 79  See id. at 302–03, 332–45 (describing this proposal).  
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CIIOC would provide additional input and oversight that could 
facilitate the consideration of different interests and perspectives and 
thereby help to limit the pernicious effects of the politics of initiative 
implementation and enforcement.  When the decisions of state 
agencies are challenged, the judiciary should consider all of the 
relevant information and exercise its own independent judgment 
regarding the best interpretation of a successful ballot measure, but 
courts should give the views of state agencies and the CIIOC respect 
based on the persuasiveness of their positions.80 
Finally, the state or local governments that authorize initiative 
lawmaking could adopt other structural reforms that would make the 
interpretive process more deliberative.81  Deliberative democratic 
theorists, such as James Fishkin and Ethan Leib, have advocated 
greater involvement by citizens in lawmaking through the use of 
techniques such as “deliberative polling” or policymaking juries.82  
The basic idea is to bring cross-sections of citizens together for a 
sufficient period of time to study the relevant issues based on 
information provided by experts and political activists with a variety 
of different perspectives.  After engaging in reasoned deliberation on 
the best course of action under the circumstances, the citizen juries 
would make recommendations to elected representatives or perhaps 
even promulgate statutes or constitutional amendments.  My sense is 
that we could potentially use deliberative juries of this nature to 
supplement the existing ballot initiative process by constituting them to 
discuss and resolve the ambiguities that will inevitably arise when the 
meaning or scope of successful popular initiatives is subsequently 
contested. 
While there are many details that would need to be resolved, the 
basic idea is to establish a mechanism that would allow (or perhaps 
require) courts to refer interpretive problems involving the meaning 
or scope of ambiguous ballot measures to a non-partisan commission 
that would conduct a “deliberative poll” on the issue.  Once an 
 
 80  Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that the 
weight of an agency’s “judgment in a particular case will depend upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control”).  
 81  See Schacter, supra note 3, at 155–56 (suggesting this possibility).  
 82  See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009); ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004) [hereinafter 
LEIB, Deliberative Democracy]; Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 
54 BUFF. L. REV. 903 (2006).  
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interpretive problem was referred from the judiciary to the 
commission,83 the commission would be required to secure the 
participation of approximately five hundred randomly selected 
citizens to serve on a deliberative jury.84  The commission would also 
be required to provide the “jurors” with briefing materials before the 
“interpretive convention,” which would include a statement of the 
issues from the court, briefs from the parties to the litigation and 
various friends of the court,85 and policy analysis from non-partisan 
experts where appropriate.  The interpretive convention would begin 
with opening statements from the commission about the nature of 
the proceedings, followed by opening arguments or reports from the 
parties and other drafters of the briefing materials.  The jurors would 
then be divided into small groups of approximately fifteen citizens 
who would engage in reasoned deliberation about the best course of 
action on the merits, and prepare questions for the parties or policy 
experts that arise from those discussions.  The deliberative jury would 
reconvene for a second plenary session wherein each small group 
would be expected to pose their questions to the parties or 
nonpartisan experts.  The small groups would then reconvene to 
discuss their impressions of the question and answer period and any 
remaining issues.  The entire group of jurors would then reconvene 
for a third plenary session where the parties would present final 
arguments and the policy experts could make closing remarks.  
Finally, the jurors would be required to cast a vote on their preferred 
interpretation of the statute under the circumstances, and to provide 
 
 83  For other more fully developed proposals to refer interpretive problems from 
courts to lawmaking bodies, see Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s 
Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons From Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 
(2012).  
 84  Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 82, at 24–31 (describing his method of deliberative 
polling and explaining that it “was developed explicitly to combine random sampling 
with deliberation”); LEIB, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 82, at 12–13, 23–25 
(advocating the use of stratified random samples of eligible voters based on Fishkin’s 
approach).  
 85  I anticipate that leave to file amicus briefs would be liberally granted and that 
it would be worthwhile for state and local governments to provide public financing to 
secure the participation of otherwise unrepresented interests with a significant stake 
in the outcome.  Cf. Schacter, supra note 3, at 156 (suggesting that “interpretive 
litigation” could most effectively ameliorate the shortcomings of the ballot initiative 
process “if courts maximized procedural opportunities for participation by a range of 
interests” by “liberally granting applications for intervention and amicus curiae 
participation” and considering “appointing pro bono representation for 
unrepresented, or even unorganized, interests”).  
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a written explanation for their final decision.86  The commission 
would tabulate the results, and provide a proposed decision to the 
court in favor of the position that secured a majority of the votes.  
While the jury’s recommendation would presumptively bind the 
court, the judiciary would have the authority to deviate from the 
jury’s proposed decision if the court found that the jury’s verdict was 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence,87 and the court provided 
a reasoned explanation for its decision.  If a lower court declined to 
follow the jury’s recommendation on this ground, however, the 
court’s decision would be subject to appellate review under an abuse 
of discretion standard.  My sense is that (frequently elected) state 
judges would be under significant pressure to follow the 
recommendations of a deliberative jury in this process, but that 
courts should nonetheless have the ability to deviate from a 
deliberative jury’s decision when necessary to protect against the 
tyranny of the majority. 
One might wonder why we would rely on deliberative juries to 
resolve contests over the meaning or scope of ambiguous ballot 
measures, when we would ordinarily rely upon administrative 
agencies or courts to resolve statutory ambiguities.  Aside from the 
shortcomings of statutory interpretation by agencies and courts in the 
initiative context that are described above, deliberative juries would 
provide the same kinds of advantages that have traditionally been 
offered to justify Chevron deference to agencies in the context of 
regulatory legislation.  In this regard, Professor Fishkin’s deliberative 
polls are conducted by using a stratified random sample of citizens in 
the relevant jurisdiction.88  He therefore touts the results of the polls 
as an accurate reflection of what the people would think about a 
problem if they had an opportunity to engage in reasoned 
deliberation about an issue.89  From this perspective, the decisions of 
a deliberative jury could provide precisely the type of political 
 
 86  On the importance of the latter requirement, see, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Reason-
Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (2009).  
 87  Cf. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 157 
(2008) (clarifying “the doctrinal underpinnings of weight-of-the-evidence review,” 
and recommending that “courts safeguard the jury-trial right both by increasing the 
trial judge’s discretion to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence and by 
requiring a balanced appellate review of decisions granting and denying new trials”).  
The court could, of course, also decline to follow a jury’s proposed verdict on the 
grounds that it would be unconstitutional.  See supra notes 51, 55, and accompanying 
text. 
 88  See FISHKIN, supra note 82, at 24–31.   
 89  See id. at 28.   
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accountability that is thought to be provided by agency decision 
making under Chevron.  Indeed, this form of political accountability 
would be considerably more direct, and thus arguably much stronger, 
than it is in the agency context.90  In addition, if the initiative 
proponents knew that any ambiguities in their proposals would 
ultimately be resolved by a deliberative jury, it would probably be fair 
to say that they have implicitly delegated any subsidiary policy issues 
for resolution by such a body.  Finally, while the jurors themselves 
would not have any particular expertise, they would hear from 
experts on the relevant issues during the course of the decision-
making process.  Accordingly, one could argue that all of the 
rationales for Chevron deference would be satisfied in this context.  
What is perhaps most important from the standpoint of contestatory 
democracy—in both agency decision making as well as in the 
initiative context—is that there are structural safeguards in place that 
encourage or require the decision makers to engage in reasoned 
deliberation during the lawmaking process. 
While relying upon deliberative juries to resolve contests over 
the meaning or scope of ambiguous ballot measures would not be 
perfect, it strikes me as substantially better than the current practice 
of relying on the pre-political preferences of initiative proponents (or 
perhaps judges) to ascertain the alleged “will of the people.”  By 
resolving interpretive disputes through the use of an impartial forum 
where “all interests are taken equally into account and only 
impartially supported decisions are upheld,”91 we would be limiting 
the possibility of arbitrary domination by the state, and thereby 
promoting the only understanding of democracy that is properly 
connected to the requirements of individual freedom.92  We would 
also be making direct democracy significantly more democratic. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars have recognized that the dominant theories of 
statutory interpretation do not translate well to the ballot initiative 
context.  Meanwhile, political scientists have pointed out that popular 
initiatives are especially likely to contain ambiguities, and there is 
often unusually strong political opposition to their implementation 
 
 90  For an argument that political accountability is actually quite weak in the 
agency context, see, for example, Staszewski, supra note 86, at 1271.   
 91  See Pettit, supra note 31, at 179; supra text accompanying note 42 (quoting 
Pettit).  
 92  See Pettit, supra note 31, at 184–85.  
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and enforcement.  Both sets of insights suggest a need for different 
ways of thinking about the interpretation and implementation of 
successful ballot measures.  I have suggested that this project can be 
advanced based on recent insights from civic republican theory, 
which understand freedom as the absence of the potential for 
arbitrary domination, and recognize that democracy should include 
both electoral and contestatory dimensions.  From this perspective, 
the ballot initiative process seems to exemplify the electoral 
dimension of democracy.  Nonetheless, this form of lawmaking is in 
desperate need of mechanisms for contestatory democracy, which 
help to ensure that all interests are taken equally into account and 
only impartially supported decisions are upheld.  I have suggested 
that this need can be satisfied by the judiciary’s use of certain 
substantive canons of statutory interpretation, or by the adoption of 
various structural reforms that would facilitate reasoned deliberation 
in the promulgation, implementation, and interpretation of 
successful ballot measures.  All of these reforms would limit the 
potential for arbitrary domination by the state, and they would 
thereby improve the democratic legitimacy of the ballot initiative 
process. 
 
